University of Tehran Press Journal for the History of Science 1735-0573 14 1 2016 07 22 The Rational and the Social Approaches to the Historiography of Science and the Problem of being Ahistorical The Rational and the Social Approaches to the Historiography of Science and the Problem of being Ahistorical 41 57 69657 10.22059/jihs.2019.259821.371454 FA Hossein Sheykhrezaee National Research Institute for Science Policy Journal Article 2018 06 09 After Kuhn and his remarks on the point that some social factors play important role in paradigm selections, it was a concern for many historians and philosophers of science that accepting such a claim would lead to anti-rationalism in the historiography of science. By proposing the concept of Methodology of Scientific Research Programmes Lakatos tried to provide a rational interpretation of history of science. However, it has been claimed that such an approach does not take into account motivations and epistemic reasons of scientists. On the other hand, proponents of the Strong Programme in the Sociology of Knowledge tried to encourage historians to take into account social factors in their histories of science. Again it is claimed that motivations and epistemic reasons of scientists are not reflected here and therefore this approach is ahistorical too. Our main concern is to consider the point that whether in the social approach epistemic reasons of scientists are somehow epiphenomena of more genuine things. By elaborating different kinds of relationships between the social and the rational it will be argued that at least in the case of the social approach the charge of being ahistorical is not too damaging. After Kuhn and his remarks on the point that some social factors play important role in paradigm selections, it was a concern for many historians and philosophers of science that accepting such a claim would lead to anti-rationalism in the historiography of science. By proposing the concept of Methodology of Scientific Research Programmes Lakatos tried to provide a rational interpretation of history of science. However, it has been claimed that such an approach does not take into account motivations and epistemic reasons of scientists. On the other hand, proponents of the Strong Programme in the Sociology of Knowledge tried to encourage historians to take into account social factors in their histories of science. Again it is claimed that motivations and epistemic reasons of scientists are not reflected here and therefore this approach is ahistorical too. Our main concern is to consider the point that whether in the social approach epistemic reasons of scientists are somehow epiphenomena of more genuine things. By elaborating different kinds of relationships between the social and the rational it will be argued that at least in the case of the social approach the charge of being ahistorical is not too damaging. https://jihs.ut.ac.ir/article_69657_75da3e2774cb3b39989faaa47ba16ae6.pdf