Rejecting the Distinction between Categorical and Conditional

Articles in Press

Document Type : Research/Original/Reqular Article

Author

Prof., Iranian Institute of Philosophy

Abstract

The transformation of categorical to conditional (and vice versa) has been a topic of extensive discussion in traditional logic and is generally accepted as an obvious fact in modern logic. Now the following questions arise:

(1) Is it possible to transform one of the categorical and conditional propositions to the other?
(2) Among the two, is one the main and the other the subsidiary?
(3) Is the distinction between categorical and conditional fundamentally important?

Frege's answer to the first question is affirmative, while his responses to the other two questions are negative. He demonstrates that the distinction between categorical and conditional, as well as the distinction between subject and predicate, is generally unimportant since they do not play a significant role in inference rules. Unlike subjects and predicates, or premises and conclusions, what matters are the logical connectives and quantifiers that bear the primary burden of logical rules. Based on this, I will attempt to show that the conversion between categorical and conditional does not create a significant distinction between traditional and modern logic, and that these two systems of logic are essentially two sides of the same coin.

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Journal for the History of Science

Articles in Press, Accepted Manuscript
Available Online from 09 August 2025

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