The Rational and the Social Approaches to the Historiography of Science and the Problem of being Ahistorical

Document Type : Research/Original/Reqular Article

Author

National Research Institute for Science Policy

Abstract

After Kuhn and his remarks on the point that some social factors play important role in paradigm selections, it was a concern for many historians and philosophers of science that accepting such a claim would lead to anti-rationalism in the historiography of science. By proposing the concept of Methodology of Scientific Research Programmes Lakatos tried to provide a rational interpretation of history of science. However, it has been claimed that such an approach does not take into account motivations and epistemic reasons of scientists. On the other hand, proponents of the Strong Programme in the Sociology of Knowledge tried to encourage historians to take into account social factors in their histories of science. Again it is claimed that motivations and epistemic reasons of scientists are not reflected here and therefore this approach is ahistorical too. Our main concern is to consider the point that whether in the social approach epistemic reasons of scientists are somehow epiphenomena of more genuine things. By elaborating different kinds of relationships between the social and the rational it will be argued that at least in the case of the social approach the charge of being ahistorical is not too damaging.

Keywords

References

Agassi, J. (1963). Towards an Historiography of Science, History and Theory, vol. 2. The Hague: Mouton.
Arabatzis T. (1994). “Rational Versus Sociological Reductionism: Imre Lakatos and the Edinburgh School”. In: Gavroglu K., Christianidis J., Nicolaidis E. (eds) Trends in the Historiography of Science. Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science, vol. 151. Springer, Dordrecht.
Bloor, D. (1976). Knowledge and Social Imagery. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press. (Second edition, enlarged, 1991).
Kim, J. (1993). “Postscripts on Supervenience,” in Supervenience and Mind: Selected Philosophical Essays. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. pp. 161–171.
Kuhn, T. S. (1970a). “Reflections on my Critics”, in I. Lakatos and A. Musgrave, 1970, pp. 231-278.
ــــــــــــــــ . (1970b). The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, Chicago: The University of Chicago Press. (Second edition).
Kusch, M. (2000). “The Sociology of Philosophical Knowledge: A Case Study and a Defense”, in The Sociology of Philosophical Knowledge, Springer.
Lakatos, I., “History of Science and its Rational Reconstructions”, in R. C. Buck and R. S. Cohen, eds., PSA 1970, Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science, 8, pp. 91-136, Dordrecht: Reidel.
Lakatos, I. and Musgrave, A., (1970). eds., Criticism and the Growth of Knowledge, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Little, D. (1991). Varieties of Social Explanation: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Social Science, Routledge.
Shapin, S. (1995). “Here and Everywhere: Sociology of Scientific Knowledge”, Annual Review of Sociology. 21(1), pp. 289-321.

Files

Share

How to cite

Statistics