Reflection on the Principle of Identity of Indiscernibles Based on Muller's defense

Document Type : Research/Original/Reqular Article

Author

master graduate, Philosophy of Science, Amir Kabir University of Technology, Tehran, Iran

Abstract

The Principle of Identity of Indiscernibles (PIIs) was first proposed by Leibniz. In this principle, he argued when two objects can be considered Indiscernible, and when two objects can be considered discernible. This principle, that is known as one of the most widely used and discussed principles in mathematics, physics, philosophy, and metaphysics, is increasingly applied when the modern physics and metaphysics deal with quantum particles, giving rise to an under-determination that has been studied from different approaches by different philosophers. Relying on some examples such as Kant’s water Drop, and black’s Spheres, some tried to reject this principle. The present study was an attempt to investigate the Principle of Identity of Indiscernibles based on Muller's defense (an article published in 2015). In his paper, Muller draws on some examples to define and formulate his arguments. In the present study, the Black’s Spheres is studied, and attempts are made to determine whether Muller's argument is defendable, and introduce the points that need to be taken into account about this example

Keywords

References

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Journal for the History of Science
Volume 16, Issue 2 - Serial Number 25
September 2019
Pages 217-230

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