سازگاری مونیسم معرفتی و نسبی‌گرایی معرفتی

نوع مقاله : مقاله پژوهشی

نویسنده

دانشجوی دکتری، پژوهشکده تاریخ علم دانشگاه تهران، تهران، ایران

چکیده

هدف مقاله حاضر، بررسی رابطه بین مونیسم و نسبی‌گرایی معرفتی است. پس از توضیح مدل استاندارد نسبی‌گرایی و کثرت‌گرایی، به یکی از تفاوت‌های اساسی بین کثرت‌گرایی و نسبی‌گرایی اشاره می‌کنیم که به مونیسم مربوط است: درحالی‌که نسبی‌گرایی ممکن است با مونیسم سازگار باشد ولی کثرت‌گرایی با مونیسم ناسازگار است. در پذیرش امکان سازگاری مونیسم با نسبی‌گرایی، باید حداقل به دو شرط توجه کرد: وابستگی و امکانی‌بودن (contingency). شرط وابستگی بااین‌که لازم است اما به تنهایی برای فهم امکان سازگاری نسبی‌گرایی با مونیسم کافی نیست و این لزوم توجه به مؤلفۀ امکانی‌بودن را نشان می‌دهد. ما نشان می‌دهیم در صورت عدم توجه به امکانی‌بودن، امکان تمایز نسبی‌گرایی از مطلق‌گرایی (در شرایطی که مونیسم حاکم است) منتفی می‌گردد. در انتها، توضیح می‌دهیم که مونیسم امکانی - بااینکه می‌تواند با نسبی‌گرایی سازگار باشد - به خودی‌خود نه دلیلی بر تأیید نسبی‌گرایی است و نه دلیلی بر نفی آن. 

کلیدواژه‌ها

موضوعات

عنوان مقاله [English]

The Compatibility of Epistemic Monism and Epistemic Relativism

نویسنده [English]

  • Jalal Abdollahi
PhD Candidate, Institute for the History of Science, University of Tehran, Tehran, Iran
چکیده [English]

The aim of the present article is to examine the relationship between monism and epistemic relativism. After explaining the standard model of relativism and pluralism, we point to one of the fundamental differences between pluralism and relativism, which concerns monism: while relativism may be compatible with monism, pluralism is incompatible with monism. Accepting the possibility of compatibility between monism and relativism requires attention to at least two conditions: dependency and contingency. Although the dependency condition is necessary, it is not by itself sufficient for understanding the possibility of compatibility between relativism and monism, and this highlights the necessity of considering the component of contingency. We demonstrate that if contingency is not considered, it becomes impossible to distinguish relativism from absolutism (under conditions where monism prevails). Finally, we explain that contingent monism-although it can be compatible with relativism-is neither in itself a reason for affirming relativism nor a reason for rejecting it.

کلیدواژه‌ها [English]

  • Relativism
  • pluralism
  • monism
  • dependency

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