نوع مقاله : مقاله پژوهشی
نویسنده
دانشجوی دکتری تاریخ علم
چکیده
کلیدواژهها
موضوعات
عنوان مقاله [English]
نویسنده [English]
The aim of the present article is to examine the relationship between monism and epistemic relativism. After explaining the standard model of relativism and pluralism, we point to one of the fundamental differences between pluralism and relativism, which concerns monism: while relativism may be compatible with monism, pluralism is incompatible with monism. Accepting the possibility of compatibility between monism and relativism requires attention to at least two conditions: dependency and contingency. Although the dependency condition is necessary, it is not by itself sufficient for understanding the possibility of compatibility between relativism and monism, and this highlights the necessity of considering the component of contingency. We demonstrate that if contingency is not considered, it becomes impossible to distinguish relativism from absolutism (under conditions where monism prevails). Finally, we explain that contingent monism—although it can be compatible with relativism—is neither in itself a reason for affirming relativism nor a reason for rejecting it. Furthermore, moving from contingent monism to either affirmed relativism or the rejection of relativism entails advancing a contentious claim and reverting to the initial disputes between relativists and their opponents.
کلیدواژهها [English]
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