تحولات در تاریخ‌نگاری علم و توجه به مسألۀ «علم و ارزش»

نوع مقاله : مقاله پژوهشی

نویسنده

پژوهشکده مطالعات بنیادین علم و فناوری، دانشگاه شهید بهشتی

چکیده

در چند دهۀ اخیر فیلسوفان علم به مسألۀ اثرگذاریِ ارزش‌ها بر نظریه‌های علمی توجه بسیار بیشتری نشان داده‌اند. تا پیش از آن، عموماً دیدگاهی حاکم بود که مرزی قاطع میان ساحت علم و ارزش رسم می‌کرد. به ویژه در نیمۀ دوم قرن بیستم، عقیده به آرمان علم غیرارزش‌بار میان فیلسوفان علم رواج داشته است که مطابق آن، در ارزیابیِ معرفتیِ نظریه‌های علمی فقط ارزش‌های معرفتی می‌توانند نقش موجهی داشته باشند. در این مقاله با مرور مختصر سیر تحولات در توجه به مسألۀ علم و ارزش در قرن بیستم، از این ادعا دفاع می‌کنیم که از جمله عوامل مهمِ توجه بیشتر به مسألۀ نقش ارزش‌ها در علمْ تحولات در تاریخ‌نگاری علم و به‌ویژه توجه به نگرش‌های برون‌گرایانه، تأکید جدی‌تر بر داده‌های تجربی، و پرهیز از مغالطه‌های گاه‌نگارانه (آناکرونیسم) در ارائۀ روایت‌های تاریخی بوده است. در بخش پایانی مقاله، به این موضوع می‌پردازیم که شناخت بهتر از نقش ارزش‌ها در علم پرسش‌های تازه‌ای پیش روی تاریخ‌نگار علم قرار می‌دهد و مفاهیم مطرح‌شده در بحث از رابطۀ علم و ارزش، مانند تمایز ارزش‌های معرفتی و غیرمعرفتی، می‌تواند چارچوب مفهومی جدیدی در اختیار تاریخ‌نگار علم قرار دهد و از این طریق احتمالاً بر نظریه‌ها و روش‌های تاریخ‌نگاری علم اثرگذار باشد.

کلیدواژه‌ها

عنوان مقاله [English]

Developments in the Historiography of Science and Appreciation of “Science and Value” Problem

نویسنده [English]

  • Meisam Mohammadamini
Institute for Science and Technology Studies, Shahid Beheshti University
چکیده [English]

In the last few decades, philosophers of science have paid much more attention to the question of the role of values in scientific theories. Before that, the prevailing view drew a sharp distinction between the scopes of science and value. Specifically, in the second part of 20th century, allegiance to the value-free ideal of science was common, which admitts only epistemic values a role in epistemic evaluation of scientific theories. In this paper, sketching a brief history of the development of the literature of “science and value”, we propose that one of the important factors contributing to raising awareness to the roles of values in science is the developments in the historiography of science, in particular, flourishing of externalist attitudes to history of science, emphasis on using accurate empirical data, and avoiding anachronistic fallacies in historical narratives. Finally, we will focus on the fact that better understanding of the role of values in science puts some new questions before the historian of science, and the concepts developed in discussion of the relationship between science and value can provide a new framework to the historian of science and, in this way, may affect theories and methods of historiography of science.

کلیدواژه‌ها [English]

  • Epistemic values
  • Non-epistemic values
  • Role of values in science
  • Value-free ideal of science

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تاریخ علم
دوره 14، شماره 1 - شماره پیاپی 20
بهار و تابستان 1395
مرداد 1395
صفحه 115-132

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